局域能源市场多产消者P2P交易框架设计

随着局域能源市场中分布式能源的大量接入和电力系统运行方式的逐渐转变,具有电能生产/消费行为的产消者得到了广泛关注与研究。在此背景下,为提高小规模能源在局域能源市场中的就地消纳能力,设计了一种面向局域能源市场中多产消者的点对点(P2P)日前市场交易框架。在局域能源市场建立了P2P市场交易平台,并对产消者的基本特征进行了归纳分析,提出了典型的产消者组合类型;在产消者层面,采用供给函数均衡模型对产消者竞价行为进行建模,确立了含多产消者的P2P交易平台参与局域能源市场交易;采用连续双边拍卖机制对产消者之间进行P2P匹配,并确定交易过程中的拍卖价格和交易价格。最后,通过算例验证了所提P2P交易框架的有效性。     

网上拍卖的隐私保护技术研究

文章利用门的安全计算和代理OT协议构造出基于第三方的门的安全计算,构造了可用于密封式拍卖方法的函数,并设计了一个可保护隐私信息的网上拍卖方案。     

Available-to-promise based bidding decision by fuzzy mathematical programming and genetic algorithm

The present study attempts to integrate bidding decisions with order promising and production planning to enhance supplier profitability and service level. This study formulates the bid price and production plan as a mixed integer programming model with fuzzy constraints. The fuzzy constraints represent the decision-maker’s subjective judgment regarding the customer’s price tolerance. The proposed model combines the advanced available-to-promise (AATP) concept to find optimum resource allocation and enable accurate estimations of production costs and delivery dates. The proposed solution procedure determines the optimum bid price by striking a compromise between profitability and the possibility to win the contract. This study develops a genetic algorithm to solve this problem, and provides computer simulated experiments to evaluate the performance of the proposed approach.     

Incentive mechanism for allocating total permitted pollution discharge capacity and evaluating the validity of free allocation

In this paper, the validity evaluation method of free allocation is studied under the background of allocating the total permitted pollution discharge capacity (TPPDC). First, the free allocation method’s localization and players’ strategic behaviors are analyzed. Second, an incentive mechanism for allocating TPPDC is proposed based on the uniform price auction of divisible goods, and an evaluation model to evaluate the validity for the free allocation of TPPDC is established, and the feasibility and reasonableness of this evaluation model are proved. Third, the evaluation criterion and the evaluation process are given. Finally, this evaluation model is applied to the environmental planning of Han River basin, and the validity evaluation result of free allocation is obtained by analyzing the statistical data of chemical oxygen demand (COD) in 14 counties and cities of Hubei Province, China. The results of our study will provide the government environmental management departments with theoretical basis and scientific methods to effectively implement the pollutant gross control system and design the related environmental policies.     

基于ASP.NET技术的网上拍卖系统的设计

采用Browser/Server软件结构,运用ASP.NET技术及SQL Server数据库开发网上拍卖系统,实现网上拍卖。阐述了系统的框架结构、数据流程分析、功能模块设计以及数据库设计。系统为拍卖交易双方提供了一个稳定运行的平台,并实现即时报价、管理拍卖商品、用户管理、反馈价格、拍卖商品等主要功能。     

一个新的分布式安全电子拍卖协议

基于Shamir的（t＋1,n）门限方案和公钥加及数字签名提出一个适于分布式松耦合发布／预约系统使用的安全电子拍卖协议。协议除满足了安全分布式拍卖的基本需求外,还保证了代理拍卖服务器的不可否认性及投标者的匿名性。与先前工作相比,新协议具有较多的安全特性,而且更适合于分布式大规模拍卖。松耦合发布预约结构广泛使用于可扩展 自适应的分布式系统中,它的灵活性使之为许多应用所采用。但是,在不安全的通信环境中,这种结构缺乏容错性和安全支持,新协议可以在分布式松耦合发布／预约系统中实现安全性和容错性,同时具有适当的运行效率。最后,我们对协议设计的正确性和效率进行了详尽分析。     

A theoretical and empirical investigation of multi‐item on‐line auctions

In this paper we explore and analyze the structure of Internet auctions from an analytical and an empirical perspective. Such web‐based auctions are rapidly emerging as a mercantile process of choice in the electronic marketplace. We observe current Internet auctions for one‐time products, such as rapidly aging hardware, and analyze them within the framework of the existing auction theory. While traditional auction theory focuses on single‐item auctions, we observe that a majority of on‐line auctions are multi‐item auctions. A significant contribution of this work is the theoretical derivation of the structure of the winning bids in multi‐item progressive on‐line auctions. Additionally, for comparative purposes, we explore the structural characteristics of alternative multi‐item auction mechanisms proposed in the auction theory. We derive hypotheses based on our analytical results and compare two different types of auction mechanisms. We test the traditional auction theory assumption regarding the homogeneity of bidders and present the first ever empirically derived classification and performance‐comparison of on‐line bidders. We test our hypotheses using real‐world empirical data obtained by tracking a premier web‐based auction site. Statistical analysis of the data indicates that firms may gain by choosing alternative auction mechanisms. We also provide directions for further exploration of this emerging but important dimension of electronic commerce. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

一种面向政府采购的多属性反向拍卖模型

为了对政府采购中电子反向拍卖系统的适用性进行改善.利用多属性决策理论和相关算法,对多属性反向拍卖的步骤和模型进行研究.对只按价格来选取供应商的方式进行了改进,建立了多属性选取供应商的反向拍卖系统.系统实现了选取供应商的自动化,能达到综合属性的最优,满足政府采购中以反拍方式进行采购的需求,提高了采购效率,降低了采购成本.